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“The Most Vivifying Influence”
Operation Delta in Preparing the Canadian
Corps for the Hundred Days
W I L L I A M F. S T E WA R T

The preparations for the projected “Delta” attack exercised the most vivifying influence on the
training of the Canadian Corps.1
—Arthur Currie, Interim Report, 1919

Abstract : Preparation and training for Operation Delta in May and June
1918 provided the Canadian Corps with vital experience for the types of
operations conducted during the Hundred Days. Delta was a proposed
attack on the southern portion of the Lys salient formed by the German
April offensive in Flanders. The operation represented a clear break
with the operational concepts employed in 1917 prior to Cambrai. It
was a difference between seeing a play diagrammed on a blackboard and
actually running it in conditions just short of combat. Having a concrete
plan to prepare schemes against was an invaluable element in readying
the corps for the strains of the Hundred Days. It helped in overcoming
the challenges of ridding the corps of old thinking, mastering the new,
and at an accelerated tempo. It was also a valuable rehearsal for the
circumstances faced by the corps at Amiens. Finally, it demonstrated
how the Canadian Corps differed from the British Army in creating and
inculcating a corps level doctrine and the mechanisms used by the senior
commanders and staff to disseminate, enforce, and practice it.

1  
Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918, (London:
Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1919), 124.
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The Most Vivifying Influence

of the German 1918 spring offensives, Cy Peck,
the rotund but combative commander of the 16th Canadian Scottish
Battalion, shared an explosive secret with his company commanders.2
They were going to participate in a multi-corps surprise offensive to
eliminate the threat to a strategically vital location.3 The enemy was
in a salient, in improvised defences, exhausted, and at the end of a
tenuous supply line. In a sharp departure from previous Canadian
engagements, this attack would feature no preliminary bombardment
nor prior gun registration. It would include masses of tanks and
aircraft and a planned advance far greater than any ever attempted
by the Canadian Corps. Further, it would secretly move to the
sector and only enter the line shortly before zero hour to deceive the
Germans. It even had its own codename––a first for the Canadians.4
When was this meeting and for what operation? Not in August
1918 but on 8 May 1918, and not the prelude to the famous Amiens
offensive but a never executed plan, codenamed Delta. It had a
crucial role in the planning, preparation, and training of the Canadian
Corps for the Hundred Days campaign. It was the essential step
in transitioning the Canadians to the far different tempo, tactics,
and practices of open warfare from the static conditions of 1917. As
the commander of the 1st Division, Major-General A.C. Macdonell,
later explained, the effect of it and the accompanying training on
“efficiency of the corps cannot be over estimated.”5
The paper’s intent is to examine the origin, purpose, course, and
consequences of Delta. It also provides a lens through which to view
how the corps translated the theoretical notions of doctrine embodied
in manuals, instructions, and notes into practice prior to battle. The
paper comprises three major sections. It starts by highlighting the
stark differences between Canadian operations at Passchendaele
and during the Hundred Days. It then examines the Delta plan and
its inception, course, and afterlife. The final section analyzes the
n the aftermath

Cy Peck would win the Victoria Cross for his heroics in the attack on the DrocourtQuéant line on 2 September 1918.
3  
Cy Peck Diary, 6-9 May 1918, MG30 E134, Peck Fonds, Library and Archives
Canada (LAC).
4  
The only previous code name for a British attack was the 1917 cancelled landing
on the Flanders shore during the Passchendaele offensive called Operation Hush.
5  
A.C. Macdonell, “The Old Red Patch as the Breaking of the Drocourt-Queant
Line, the Crossing of the Canal Du Nord and the Advance on Cambrai, 30 Aug.--2nd
Oct. 1918,” Canadian Defence Quarterly IV, no. 4 (1927), 389.
2  
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Figure 1. Cy Peck the rotund, but combative commander of the 16th Canadian Scottish
Battalion. He is shown wearing his VC. [LAC PA-006713]

doctrinal sources, the Canadian reaction to Delta, how it shaped
their preparations for the Hundred Days, and its importance and
influence. The paper’s basis are two sets of documents: the relevant
war diaries in the Canadian Corps, at the First Army, and at ghq
and training instructions down to the battalion level. Appropriate
scholarly publications and secondary sources were also consulted.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018

3

Canadian Military History, Vol. 27 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 1
4

The Most Vivifying Influence

While often mentioned in histories of the Canadian Corps, there
has never been a detailed description and analysis of this proposed
operation and how it impacted the preparations for the Hundred Days.6
Tim Cook does not explicitly refer to Delta in his Shock Troops. But,
he does provide an excellent overview of the shift to open warfare
from the narrow confines and mental horizons of trench to trench
attacks that were fostered by it.7 Shane Schreiber in his Shock Army
of the British Empire does briefly discuss Delta, Currie’s quotation
on its importance, and the training that set up the Canadians for
the Hundred Days.8 Two authors, however, argue there was no great
transformation in tactics and doctrine in 1918. David Campbell, in
his thesis on the 2nd Division, does not see any fundamental change
in the Canadian doctrine from 1917.9 The 1918 doctrine was just a
modified or adapted version of the previous approach and that the
corps had already employed infiltration tactics at Vimy.10 This view
may be shaped by his natural focus on the 2nd Division, which was
the one major unit that did not take part in the Delta preparations.
Mark Humphries in his provocatively named article, “The Myth
of the Learning Curve,” describes the training the 12th Brigade
undertook for Delta as part of the piece. The article’s central premise
is “that while combat became more complex and “all arms” oriented,
the basic tactical concepts of 1916 essentially remained the same in

6  
G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, (Ottawa: R.
Duhamel, Queen’s Printer, 1964), 382; Kenneth Radley, We Lead, Others Follow:
First Canadian Division 1914-1918, (St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Pub., 2006), 325;
Shane B. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the
Last 100 Days of the Great War, Praeger Series in War Studies (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1997), 28; S.F. Wise, “The Black Day of the German Army: Australians and
Canadians at Amiens, August 1918,” in 1918 Defining Victory, ed. by Peter Dennis
(Army History Unit, 1999), 4; Ian M. McCulloch, “The ‘Fighting Seventh’: The
Evolution and Devolution of Tactical Command and Control in a Canadian Infantry
Brigade of the Great War,” MA Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1997,
254; Ian Malcolm Brown, “Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie and the Canadian
Corps 1917-1918: The Evolution of a Style of Command and Attack,” MA Thesis,
University of Calgary, 1991, 72; John Alexander Swettenham, To Seize the Victory:
The Canadian Corps in World War I, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 205.
7  
Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918, (Toronto:
Viking Canada, 2008), 403-7.
8  
Schreiber, Shock Army, 27-8.
9  
David Charles Gregory Campbell, “The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A
Social and Operational History of the 2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918,” PhD
dissertation, University of Calgary, 2003, 371.
10  
Ibid., 408-10.
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1918.”11 He has since backed away from this view. He now agrees that
tactical changes did occur but were not as important as the decline
in the combat capability of the German army in 1918 in explaining
the allied success in the Hundred Days.12

passchendaele and aftermath
Delta’s importance of lay in its role in helping the corps’ commanders, staff,
and troops make the transition from the careful step-by-step deliberate
pace of the attacks of 1917 to the torrid rates of 1918. It is therefore
important to understand where they started. Meticulous preparation,
days of bombardment and rehearsals, gathering detailed information
on enemy positions, developing absolute firepower supremacy, and a
measured pace characterized Passchendaele, along with the ubiquitous
mud and terrible terrain conditions.13 It featured short advances, narrow
frontages, and dense artillery support and assault formations. Table
1 illustrates these crucial differences. The speed of preparations at
Passchendaele was in large part the result of the abysmal state of the
line of communications, weather, and terrain conditions.
In the Hundred Days, frontages were two to three times wider
than in 1917 and the advances ten times deeper. While the field
artillery density was half, smoke was part of every barrage instead
of an ancillary munition, there was no preliminary bombardment,
and the artillery used predictive fire rather than registration.14 The
corps took elaborate measures to ensure secrecy, something that was
not possible in Flanders, and units entered the line only hours before
an attack instead of days.15 There was no opportunity for exhaustive
Mark Osborne Humphries, “The Myth of the Learning Curve: Tactics and
Training in the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1916-1918,” Canadian Military
History 14, no. 4 (2005), 15.
12  
Mark Humphries, ‘The Myth of the Learning Curve Article Reference,’ Email, 19
September 2017.
13  
Brown, “Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie and the Canadian Corps 19171918,” 41-2.
14  
Smoke at Passchendaele was used to create a smoke screen on the corps flank, to
signal the 18-pounder barrage had reached its final protective barrage line, and to
create a smoke screen on a specific location to blind enemy observers. War Diary,
GOCRA Canadian Corps, October 1917 Appendix H Frontages of Barrage, RG9
III-D-3 v4957, LAC; ibid., Artillery Order No.95, 28 October 1917; ibid., Artillery
Order, No.101, 4 November 1917; ibid., Artillery Order, No.92, 23 October 1917.
15  
Canadian Corps G.724/27-3, 20 November 1917, 85/8, RG9 III-C-1 v3859, LAC.
11  
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Table 1. Passchendaele and Hundred Days Comparison.

intelligence collection or rehearsals. The tempo of the operations was
at a blistering pace. The barrages lifts advanced at twice the rate as
before. Rather than a four-day gap between attacks, or seven if there
was a divisional relief, the corps launched assaults on successive days.
At Arras, the corps launched division-scale operations within six and
half hours of the order being issued. Finally, at Amiens the Canadian
Corps employed four battalions of tanks amounting to 162 fighting
vehicles versus none at Passchendaele.16 The contrast between the
1917 and 1918 engagements was dramatic.
Nicholson, CEF, 396-7.
Large numbers of guns were not operational, hence the lower density

16  
17  
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The Canadian Corps emerged from Passchendaele envisioning
that its next offensive would be similar. As with the Somme campaign,
the corps distributed a detailed questionnaire down to the battalion
level posing multiple questions on tactics, organization, weapons,
and munitions. Assuming that prolonged bombardments, meticulous
preparation, dense defences, and a ponderous pace would characterize
the next attack shaped both the questionnaire and its responses.18
This expectation carried over into the training that the commander
of the Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, ordered
in the offensive’s aftermath. The corps issued Notes on Training
on 27 November 1917, and these did not reflect the lessons of the
revolutionary tactics of the Cambrai tank offensive launched on 20
November 1917. Currie hoped that the 1st and 2nd Divisions would
have a month out of the line for training and these notes were to guide
their instruction.19 Recent experience in Flanders clearly conditioned
them. The focus was on defeating pillboxes and shell hole defences
with section rushes protected by a slow barrage moving 100 metres
every eight minutes. Open warfare was to be practiced only if time
were available. It was to “bring home to Officers the necessity that
arises in such circumstances for quick decisions and prompt issue
of orders.” The instructions strongly indicated that the principles of
trench and open warfare were essentially the same with the primary
difference being the tempo. This changed significantly in the training
conducted for Delta. The corps made efforts to provide opportunity
for instruction in the first quarter of the year, but the success of the
German offensive and Currie’s strenuous defensive measures meant
little was carried out.

operation delta
Operation Delta was a reaction to the German Lys offensive in April
1918 where its advance threatened the vital Béthune coal fields

Canadian Corps GS War Diary, Canadian Corps G.116/3 – 93, 28 October 1917,
RG9 III-D-3 v4816, LAC; 7th Brigade BMR 34/2, 28 November 1917, 34/2, RG9
III-C-3 v4154, LAC; 9th Brigade War Diary, RG9 III-D-3 v4188, LAC.
19  
Canadian Corps G.882/14-3, 27 November 1917 and Canadian Corps Notes on
Training, November 1917, 25/1, RG9 III-C-3 v4186, LAC.
18  
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Figure 2. German Operation Georgette, 9-29 April 1918. [Author]

that provided seventy percent of France’s remaining coal output.20
Codenamed Georgette, it was a scaled down version of a more
ambitious plan. The losses suffered in the March offensive, resources
absorbed in holding the massive salient it created, and the failure
Haig Diary, 12 April 1918, Part 1 No. 96, Haig’s Autograph Great War Diary, Haig
Papers; NLS; David T. Zabecki, “Operational Art and the German 1918 Offensives,”
PhD dissertation, Cranfield University, 2004, 348.

20  
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of the Mars offensive on the Arras front, forced the German high
command to scale back their expectations.21 Instead of a knock-out
blow as initially envisioned, they intended it to force the British to
commit their remaining reserves to wear them down. The Germans
skilfully disguised the size and scope of the offensive, and ghq was
unprepared for its success. Aiding the attackers, the spring conditions
were dry, so the ground was firmer than normal.22 See Figure 2
German Operation Georgette, 9-29 April 1918 for more details.
The Germans attacked on 9 April with their customary ferocity
and hit a weakly held sector. Of the six defending divisions, four had
suffered heavily in the March offensive and so were shadows of their
former effectiveness.23 Disastrously, the fifth was the 2nd Portuguese
Division. A British unit was to relieve it that night because of British
doubts as to its reliability.24 Doubts that were realized in the attack
as it collapsed. By day’s end, the Germans had driven a 16 kilometre
wide and 9 kilometre deep salient into the British line and, according
to one historian, “scored a tactical success unparalleled on the
Western Front.”25 Initially, ghq underestimated the nature of the
attack, believing it just a diversion to pull reserves from the Arras
sector, but there were two bright spots for the British.26 The British
55th Division had stubbornly defended the southern hinge of the
line and frustrated German plans to widen the attack. Secondly, the
Germans were facing severe challenges in moving their artillery and
supplies forward. Soft ground restricted wheeled traffic to badly torn
up roadways, and they needed multiple bridges to cross the numerous
watercourses.27
In the following days, the Germans extended the attack front
further north engulfing the Second Army. Resistance on the southern
sector caused Germans to push the advance northwest rather than

Chris Baker, The Battle for Flanders: German Defeat on the Lys, 1918, (Barnsley:
Pen & Sword Military, 2011), 4-6.
22  
Ibid., 24.
23  
J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918, vol. 2: MarchApril, (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1937), 159.
24  
Michael Senior, Haking, a Dutiful Soldier: Lieutenant General Sir Richard Haking,
XI Corps Commander, 1915-18: A Study in Corps Command, (Barnsley: Pen &
Sword Military, 2012), loc 4648. Kindle edition.
25  
Martin Kitchen, The German Offensives of 1918, (Charleston, SC: Tempus,
2001), 108.
26  
Ibid., 109; Zabecki, “Operational Art and the German 1918 Offensives,” 330.
27  
Baker, Battle for Flanders, 35.
21  
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purely west. Westward was a strategically more important direction,
as it threatened vital British lines of communication.28 Still, they
chewed up British formations and the First Army was breaking
down into scattered pockets of resistance except where fresh divisions
entered the line.29 The success of the offensive caused Haig to issue
his famous ‘Backs to the Wall’ special order of the day.30 By 13
April, the Germans were within eight kilometres of Hazebrouck, a
vital rail centre.31 They were on the cusp of a significant victory but
reinforcements and the exhaustion of the thrusting German forward
units denied them that success.32 They still made further gains and
forced the Second Army to fall back from Passchendaele Ridge
gained at so great a cost in 1917. The Germans renewed the attack
on the southern sector to take Givenchy, Festubert, and Béthune
on 18 April. The defenders decisively defeated this assault.33 The
German high command stopped the offensive on 29 April, because of
the exhaustion of their forces, heavy losses, set defences, and French
reserves tipping the tide.

delta’s course
Even before the Germans had abandoned their Lys offensive,
General Henry Horne, commander of the First Army, proposed a
counterattack to drive back the threat to the vital Béthune coalfields.
Horne’s army held the southern portion of the Lys salient as part of
its front. He called a conference in mid-April with the commanders
of the I and XI Corps to discuss a limited assault. It was intended
to push back the Germans 2,000 to 2,500 metres––the limit of the
18-pounder field gun barrage––on the southern sector of the Lys
salient. Both corps commanders argued against the plan as they
contended the short advance did not justify the cost and loss of

Edmonds, Military Operations, 1918 vol. 2, 299.
Ibid., 224.
30  
D. Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918, Paperback
ed. (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 73.
31  
Senior, Haking, loc 4797.
32  
Edmonds, Military Operations, 1918 vol. 2, 2, 258.
33  
Ibid., 357.
28  
29  
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Figure 3. General Henry Horne on the right and Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie in the
centre tour the Vimy front in July 1917 with the King on the left. [LAC PA-001502]

prepared positions.34 Horne accepted his subordinates’ objections
and backed away from the operation.
On a visit to ghq on 28 April, Haig likely pressured Horne to
be more aggressive. That afternoon Horne met with his corps, tank,
and r af commanders to discuss a more ambitious scheme codenamed Delta.35 This plan included the Canadian Corps then serving
in the First Army on the Vimy front. Haig was planning to relieve
the Canadians and place them into ghq reserve. From there they
could secretly move to take part in the offensive. In what would

First Army GS War Diary, Re: Offensive Action by I and XI Corps, 17 April 1918,
WO 95/176/3, The National Archives (TNA); ibid., First Army GS 1160, 17 April
1918.
35  
Ibid., WO 95/176/1 28 April 1918.
34  
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become a common occurrence, German actions or their threat forced
a suspension of Delta the next day.36 The corps was to continue
planning and preparations for the operation.37
In the hiatus after the German attack on the Lys sputtered out, a
major concern for Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Commander-in-Chief
of Allied Armies, and Field Marshal Douglas Haig, the Commanderin-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force (bef), was where the
next blow would land. Haig believed it would be against the British
Somme front while Foch argued for a German renewal of the Flanders
offensive. In a letter to Haig on 3 May, he recommended that the best
way to counter this was to attack the Lys salient with the Canadians.
Haig replied that the preparations were already in progress, and he
had withdrawn the Canadians for that purpose.38 At this point, the
Germans had not picked up the start of the corps’ relief on their 4
May intelligence map. The 12 May one correctly showed it in the
First Army’s rear.39 Haig thought it prudent though to delay the
operation given the scale of the threat and the need for reserves.40
Horne suspended Delta until the end of May when it re-emerged
as Delta A. Foch’s Directive No. 3 of 20 May tasked the French and
British Commanders-in-Chief to prepare two operations. First, clear
the Amiens-Paris railway and, second, free the Béthune coalfields
from German shelling.41 This second task was effectively a version of
Delta. The offensively minded Foch desired seizing the initiative after
three weeks of quiet. In response, Haig directed Horne to consider an
attack to clear away the Germans in this sector. Horne met with his
corps commanders on 25 May where he likely raised the possibility of

First Army No GS 1185, 29 April 1918, 72/1, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
First Army No GS 1195, 30 April 1918, 72/1, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
38  
Haig was stretching the truth on this point as only the 3rd Division was relieved,
although the 1st and 4th had orders for their relief.
39  
“Abteilung Fremde Heere Zur Verteilung Der Französischen, Englischen
Und Belgischen Streitkräfte an Der Westfront Vom 04.05.1918,” http://tsamo.
germandocsinrussia.org/pages/44716/map, (2 June 2017); “Abteilung Fremde Heere
Zur Verteilung Der Französischen, Englischen Und Belgischen Streitkräfte an Der
Westfront Vom 12.05.1918,” http://tsamo.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/44717/
map (2 June 2017).
40  
J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918, vol. 3: May-July,
(London: Macmillan and co., 1939), 18.
41  
Ibid., 339.
36  
37  
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carrying out a resuscitated Delta.42 The First Army issued a formal
order two days later.43
The situation, however, had changed in three important respects
from its first incarnation. Now the Canadian Corps, with the 1st,
3rd, and 4th Divisions, was immediately available in ghq reserve.
The 2nd Division was still in the line but the corps expected its relief
shortly.44 Horne needed ghq’s permission to use the Canadians, but
there would be none of the delays in getting them relieved. Secondly,
the attack sector was a much tougher target. Six rested divisions,
with improved defences and communications and reinforced by a full
complement of field and heavy artillery, now defended the zone. As
a result, Horne would marshal a force of fourteen divisions, with
five of them comprising twelve battalions. This was a rarity in the
British Army which had converted almost all its divisions to nine
battalions.45
Horne waffled considerably on whether to cancel Delta A. On
30 May, Horne’s corps commanders persuaded him that the plan was
not suitable, and he informed ghq .46 He scrapped it because the plan
would not bring the German communications at Estaires, in the rear
of the current salient, in range of British guns. Also, it meant losing
the advantages of having good observation over the rear areas and
force artillery batteries to advance to more exposed positions. He
recommended not proceeding but suggested a far more limited action
on the southern flank of the salient.
Haig was unpersuaded, as he was under considerable pressure
from Foch to attack, and he ordered Horne to continue. Horne met
with his corps, tank, and air force commanders and their senior staff
to discuss a revised Delta A again on 3 June.47 He chided them for
their requests for quantities of guns and ammunition as if it were
a 1917 trench to trench attack. He called for surprise and minimal
preliminary bombardment as, “The enemy has taught us that such

First Army GS War Diary, WO 95/176/9, 25 May 1918, TNA.
First Army No GS 1237/1, 27 May 1918, 72/2, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
44  
It was not relieved until July.
45  
These five consisted of the four Canadian divisions and the British 5th Division
recently transferred from Italy which still had 12 battalions.
46  
First Army GS War Diary, WO 95/177/4, TNA, First Army No. GS 1237/3, 30
May 1918.
47  
Notes on Conference of Corps Commanders Held by GOC First Army, 3 June
1918, 72/2, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
42  
43  
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prolonged bombardments … are disadvantageous.” Following the
German approach, a deluge of artillery would pound enemy batteries,
headquarters, and strong points over a five-hour period. A key part
of the plan was four battalions of 144 tanks. They comprised two
echelons with forty percent assigned to the first one and sixty percent
to the second echelon, when the artillery support was weaker. Overall,
the intent was a fast tempo with only one 30-minute pause on the
first objective line to allow units to leapfrog. Finally, the Canadian
Corps would not enter the line until the last minute to surprise the
Germans. Canadian presence in the sector would be a sure sign of an
impending operation, given their reputation as storm troops. After
the conference, Horne ordered the corps commanders to resubmit
their proposals based on his new scheme.48
Both the Canadian Corps and the 3rd Division issued revised
Delta A plans on 7 and 19 June.49 Then at some point after this the
high command suspended operation. There are no records in the war
diaries and available files of ghq , First Army, or the Canadian Corps
when it was formally suspended, but the 12th Brigade returned all
its Delta materials to the 4th Division on 26 June.50 This strongly
indicates the operation was definitely cancelled by this date.
While Delta never occurred, other smaller scale engagements
took place in that sector. On 7 June, Foch requested Haig carry
out minor operations north of the Somme supported by tanks to tie
down enemy forces. Haig responded by ordering his armies to propose
raids or attacks consisting of a handful of battalions. On the First
Army front, the scope of a Delta-type operation was dramatically
scaled back and two separate assaults occurred in later June. The
British 3rd Division launched a three-battalion attack codenamed
Delta B on the night of 14/15 June that resulted in a 1,000-metre
gain on a 2,000-metre front.51 The British 5th and 31st Divisions
launched another successful limited operation on 28 June. Codenamed

First Army No GS 1237/6, 4 June 1918, 72/2, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
From internal evidence and the later corps plan, the 3rd Division plan was
misdated to 7 April but should have been June. The Germans had not yet attacked
on the Lys yet. See 3rd Canadian Division Instructions for Offensive Delta No. 1, 7
April [June] 1918 72/8, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC; Canadian Corps G.626/2521-2, 19
June 1918, 72/4, RG9 III-C-3 v3854, LAC.
50  
12th Brigade War Diary, 26 June, RG9 III-D-3 v4909, LAC.
51  
First Army GS War Diary, Report on Operations Carried out by 3rd Division on
14/15 June 1918, TNA.
48  
49  
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Figure 4. View of the low, flat, and open terrain at Festubert. Photo taken in spring 1919.
[LAC PA-004449]

Borderlands, it was in the same region as the proposed Delta attack
and better aligned the defensive systems of the First and Second
Armies.52 These attacks were in response to Foch’s demand to tie
down enemy forces.53

delta plan
Low, flat, and open terrain but cut up by hedges and drainage
canals characterized the Delta operations area. Often bordered by
thick thorn hedges, the multiple canals in the area were generally
too wide to jump and too muddy to wade across. The three major
waterways, the Lys and Lawe Rivers and the La Basée canal, were
all 15 metres wide and required bridging. The water table was so
high that troops could only dig trenches to a depth of two-thirds
of a metre, with the defenders to be largely protected by sandbag

5th Division War Diary, 28 June 1918, WO 95/1516/4, TNA; 31st Division War
Diary, 28 June 1918, WO 95/2343/5, TNA; Edmonds, Military Operations, 1918,
vol. 3, 3, 195-7; Senior, Haking, loc 5134-5184.
53  
Edmonds, Military Operations, 1918, vol. 3, 166.
52  
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Figure 5. First Army Delta plan. Minor watercourses are only shown in the operation area.
[Author]

breastworks. Furthermore, the ground, while dryer than usual, still
restricted vehicle and gun movement to the roads. These terrain
conditions were a key reason the sector had seen no offensive action
since 1915.54
The German defenders in early May had participated in the Lys
operation and were understrength, with poor communications, and
suffering from low morale. With such weak defences, Horne in his
original Delta operation planned a surprise assault with five divisions,
later six. As shown in Figure 5, he called for an advance to a depth
Topographical Notes on Locon-Merville Front, 3 May 1918, 72/7, RG9 III-C-3
v3854, LAC; Edmonds, Military Operations, 1918, vol. 2, 258.

54  
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of 7,500 metres to bring the British line to the Lawe and Lys rivers;
ideally with bridgeheads across both. There would be no preliminary
bombardment, and the attack force would include a brigade of 108
tanks. The additional artillery was to move into position the night
before, with the Canadian gunners taking over the already in-position
guns.55 The corps was to advance through the forces already in line
to shield the presence of the Canadians on this front. Unlike Amiens,
however, the steps to ensure secrecy were far less stringent. There
was no deception program and attack information reached down to
company commanders prior to even setting a date for the offensive.56
At Amiens, junior officers did not learn about it until shortly before
its start.57
The Canadian attack would consist of three divisions advancing
on a 12,000-metre front with a depth of advance of 5,500 to 7,500
metres. Four companies of tanks with forty-eight vehicles were to
support the corps. The commander of the Canadian Corps’ artillery,
Brigadier-General ‘Dinky’ Morrison, asked for twenty-one field
artillery brigades and nine heavy artillery brigades split between
counter-battery and infantry support missions. This would work out
to 30 metres per 18-pounder gun. This was almost half the density of
the barrage at the Battle of Courcelette on 15 September 1916 and a
third of the Passchendaele plan.58 The field artillery would split into
two-thirds positioned at the standard distances from the front to fire
the rolling barrage to a depth of 2,500 metres, and the other third
installed in silent positions within a kilometre of the line. This would
extend the barrage to 3,500 metres. This meant the guns could only
fully support the advance for one-third of its planned depth. When the
rear batteries reached their range limits, they were to limber-up and
advance to assist the later stages of the attack––a type of mobility
impossible at Passchendaele. This presented a major challenge for the
engineers. The cut-up nature of the terrain required careful advanced
First Army No. GS 1183/4, 3 May 1918, 72/1, RG9 III-C-3 v3854, LAC; Corps
Commanders Conference, 1 May 1918, 72/10, RG9 III-C-3 v3854, LAC.
56  
Peck Diary, 6-9 May 1918, LAC; 12th Brigade War Diary, 7 May 1918, LAC.
57  
For instance, the 29th Battalion’s company commanders did not learn of the
Amiens operation until 5 August 1918, see 29th Battalion War Diary, 5 August 1918,
RG9 III-D-3 v4936, LAC.
58  
William F. Stewart, The Canadians on the Somme, 1916: Canada’s Neglected
Campaign, Wolverhampton Military Studies, (Solihull, West Midlands, England:
Helion, 2017), 156; GOCRA War Diary, October 1917 Appendix H Frontages of
Barrage, LAC.
55  
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planning to ensure they built sufficient bridges to span the numerous
drainage ditches and repaired the roads and tracks.59
Currie met with all his senior staff and the division commanders
and staff of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions.60 The 2nd Division was
still in line under command of the VI Corps and was unlikely to
be relieved in time to serve in this attack. Its second-most senior
general staff officer represented it. Currie introduced the plan and
stressed the vital importance of secrecy. He put all the officers
informed of the plan on their honour to not divulge any details. The
battle would consist of a series of attacks on the defended localities
with enemy visibility obscured by smoke. Units were to press on and
not concern themselves with their flanks but only their assignments.
Wire communications could not keep up with the proposed rapid
advance. Thus, a far greater reliance on visual means and wireless
was necessary, along with the usual runners and despatch riders.
The senior staff then reviewed their responsibilities. There was a
significant conflict between the artillery and tank plan.61 The
gunners complained the tank plan would interfere with the artillery
program while the tankers responded that the gunners’ proposal
would put the tanks at peril. This was one symptom of the still
nascent understanding of tank limitations and capabilities in relation
to the other arms. Further, the draft scheme called for an advance
by Whippet tanks (lighter and faster than the heavy ones) down the
Locon-Lestrem Road running through the centre of the attack front
to disrupt German defences.62 The fundamental issue was that the
ground was not suitable for tanks, so they could only run on roads
and this limited their effectiveness. Most of the roads in this sector
ran at right angles to the advance axis. Currie ordered the gunners
and tanks to work out their differences.63
In an undated and unsigned memo, likely by a tank officer, the
author recommended only committing the tanks to the later stages
Artillery Appreciation, 2 May 1918, 72/5, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC; Artillery
Instructions with Reference to ‘Delta’ Operations. Undated [1-5 May1918], 32/1,
RG9 III-C-1 v3909, LAC.
60  
Corps Commanders Conference, 1 May 1918, LAC.
61  
Likely the author was the commander of the 11th Tank Battalion, who was
unnamed in the notes from the conference.
62  
Christopher Byrnley Hammond, “The Theory and Practice of Tank Cooperation
with Other Arms on the Western Front in the First World War,” PhD dissertation,
University of Birmingham, 2005, 260.
63  
There was no documentation found on how or if they resolved this conundrum.
59  
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of the advance.64 The major threat to them was anti-tank defences
usually located in the forward zone. Further, the artillery could not
support the advance to its full depth. The solution was to commit
the tanks later when the gunners were less effective and where the
infantry had already overrun the anti-tank guns.65
The First Army then issued a detailed explanation of Horne’s
intent for the attack. He repeatedly emphasized this was not a trench
to trench assault similar to those in 1917 but a surprise one with
a rapid tempo. For instance, “The long pauses for consolidation of
intermediate objectives and for passing through of reserves, to which
we have become accustomed in our attacks on successive lines of
trenches, are out of place.”66 The density of artillery support typically
assigned in 1917 was unnecessary given the rudimentary German
defences. Gunners would also have to be ready to advance after firing
their initial barrage to assist the plan’s later stages. Horne suspended
all preparations on 8 May in the expectation that the Germans were
about to attack again.67 Somewhat surprisingly, the lower echelons
did not learn of this postponement for another three days.68
In the Delta A plan, the Canadian Corps would be responsible
for its centre. Two divisions would advance on a 5,400-metre front
with a planned penetration of 7,000 metres. The ground was now
finally dry and, other than known soft spots, could support tanks.
As a result, they were no longer restricted to roads. Currie issued the
corps outline plan on 29 May. It was based on a two-division front
supported by a tank battalion (thirty-six tanks) with one division in
corps reserve and another in army reserve.69 With the increase in the
strength of the defences, a short bombardment similar to those used
by the Germans would precede the assault. It would be brief, intense,
and featuring liberal amounts of gas. The artillery assessment, given
the reduced frontage, called for twelve brigades of field artillery and
three heavy artillery brigades for counter-battery missions and four
The author was probably Brigadier-General C.D. Baker-Carr, commander of the
1st Tank Brigade assigned to the First Army.
65  
Suggested Employment of Tanks, Undated [May 1918], 72/5, RG9 III-C-3 v3854,
LAC.
66  
First Army No GS 1183/5, 4 May 1918, 31/1, RG9 III-C-1 v3909, LAC.
67  
First Army No GS 1182/11, 8 May 1918, 72/1, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC; 11th
Brigade War Diary, 9 May 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4905, LAC; Haig Diary, 7 May 1918,
NLS; Edmonds, Military Operations, 1918, vol. 3, 19.
68  
12th Brigade War Diary, 11 May 1918, LAC.
69  
Canadian Corps G.979/2521, 29 May 1918, 72/4, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
64  
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more for supporting the infantry.70 This worked out to Morrison’s
ideal of 25 metres per 18-pounder gun. The 1st Tank Brigade pointed
out the changed conditions of dry ground, badly shelled roads, and
additional German guns meant the planned use of tanks in the
original Delta plan no longer applied.71 This planning process was
an important step for the staff and commanders in converting from
trench to trench attacks to the type practiced in the Hundred Days.

sources of doctrinal changes
There was a profound change in the ten months between
Passchendaele and Amiens in the Canadian Corps. The training
of the individual soldier and sections did not alter dramatically as
firing a rifle or Lewis Gun was effectively the same with wave or
infiltration tactics. The major changes were at the higher levels of
command from battalion and above. Seven key doctrinal influences
shaped this remarkable turnaround. These included the British
success at Cambrai that featured many aspects of the later Amiens
attack, such as massed tanks, surprise, predictive artillery fire
with no preliminary bombardment, and a rapid, deep advance.72
The bef ’s offensive doctrine underwent significant modification.
ghq codified this in documents widely distributed such as ss 204
Infantry and Tank Co-operation and Training 1918, ss 135 The
Training and Employment of Divisions 1918, and a myriad of other
instructional publications. The shock of the German success in their
1918 spring offensives demonstrated the effectiveness of infiltration
tactics and surprise and that prolonged deliberate bombardments
were unnecessary.73 “Well, we expected it [the German offensive]
but were shocked at the advances made. They were so spectacular
to anything that we had experienced before that we just couldn’t
understand it,” was how Brigadier-General Alex Ross later described

Canadian Corps G.99/2521, 2 June 1918, 72/4, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC; RA
Canadian Corps 2297, 1 June 1918, 72/3, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
71  
1st Tank Brigade, MWS/101/12, 29 May 1918, 72/13, RG9 III-C-1 v3854, LAC.
72  
Christopher Pugsley, “Haig and the Implementation of Tactical Doctrine on
the Western Front” in Sandhurst Occasional Papers, (Sandhurst: Royal Military
Academy, 2011), 42.
73  
For instance, see Notes on Conference, LAC.
70  
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the attack’s impact.74 ghq used captured German orders issued as
Notes on Recent Fighting as a further means of inculcating changes
in attitude and orientation to open warfare.75 The Canadians studied
them closely, and according to Currie’s 1919 Interim Report they, “to
a large extent, inspired our training.”76 For instance, he underlined
text and made marginalia in his version of Notes on Recent Fighting
No. 14.77 Currie ordered his generals to review that document and
have battalion commanders run schemes based on its principles.78
The Australian success at Hamel on 4 July removed any lingering
doubts regarding the effectiveness of a tank-led offensive even if
the advance was shallow.79 The Canadian Corps also issued its own
guidance for training divisions in open warfare such as G.135/14-3 on
30 April. Its key point was that the object of attack was to “obtain
superiority of fire.”80 Again, the Interim Report referred to the corps
“laying down a definitive Corps tactical doctrine.”81 The commander
of the 1st Division recorded spending 1 May reviewing this order.82
The final influence was Delta and the training that accompanied it,
which is discussed in greater detail below.

delta training
The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions left the line starting on the 3 May
1918 and moved into the First Army’s rear areas. They spent the rest
of May, June, and part of July in training. In some cases, units were
on short notice to respond to a German attack which limited what
B.G. Ross, CBC Interview, RG41 v21, Tape 3, 13, LAC.
See for instance, Notes on Recent Fighting No. 14, 7 June 1918, O-3-30, RG9
III-B-1 v2279, LAC.
76  
Report of the Ministry, 123; Macdonell, “Old Red Patch 1,” 388.
77  
Notes on Recent Fighting No. 14 German Methods of Overcoming Machine Gun
Defences, 19801226-273/58A 1 60.2, Currie Fonds, Canadian War Museum (CWM).
78  
Currie to Lipsett, 23 June 1918, 2/3, RG9 III-C-3 v4187, LAC; 1st Division G.7135, 24 June 1917, 167, MG30 E100 v37, Currie Fonds, LAC.
79  
The advance at Hamel was the limit of the 18-pounder barrage, at 2,500 metres on
a front of 6,000 metres expanding to 7,500 metres at the end of the advance. Notes
Compiled by G.S. Fourth Army on the Operations by the Australian Corps against
Hamel, Bois De Hamel, and Bois De Vaire, on 4th of July, 1918., RG24 v22018, LAC.
See also Hammond, “Tank Cooperation,” 278-87.
80  
Canadian Corps G.135/14-3, 30 April 1918, 13/4, RG9 III-C-3 v4201, LAC.
81  
Report of the Ministry, 124.
82  
A.C. Macdonell Diary, 1 May 1918, MG30 E20 v1, A.C. Macdonell Fonds, LAC.
74  
75  
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they could do. They also moved several times during this period.
The 2nd Division had only two weeks out of the line for training
in July.83 It spent May and June still at the front in the VI Corps.
While the preparations for Delta were primarily in May, its influence
reverberated throughout the training period.
Many senior officers and planners visited the proposed attack
front, and this influenced the exercises. For instance, 1st Division
commander, Major-General Macdonell, met Major-General David
Watson, the 4th Division commander, at British 3rd Division
headquarters while he was surveying the situation at the front for
Delta.84 So many visited that the 12th Brigade issued a warning
not to show maps or have too many officers in view of the Germans
on the Hinges-Mt Bernenchon Ridge.85 The visits helped inform
the preparations, and how the authorities laid out the schemes. For
instance, the 3rd Brigade’s instructions for a manoeuvre on 23 May
stated, “The scheme has been made to conform as closely as possible
to the DELTA Scheme. The locations of strong points have been
chosen with this end in view.”86
At its core, the open warfare training involved explaining the
new doctrine to all ranks and then practicing it in schemes at the
platoon and up to division level. Initially, it was done slowly so that
it was understood, and then later at battle speed. The instructional
focus was on infiltration tactics, penetrating machine gun defences
by fire, use of ground, support of nearby platoons, cooperation with
tanks, forward artillery and light and medium trench mortars, and
exploiting smoke.87 Most schemes included combinations of all these
weapon systems and often aircraft to practice combined arms. The
exercises involved far wider frontages and deeper advances than had
ever before been attempted by the Canadians. For instance, the 2nd
Brigade scheme for 15 May practiced an advance of 3,800 metres
with German defences consisting of non-continuous strongpoints.88

2nd Division GS War Diary, July 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4846, LAC.
Macdonell Diary, 6 May 1918, LAC.
85  
See for instance, 12th Brigade (Delta) Instruction No. 1, 7 May 1918, 30/3, RG9
III-C-3 v4234, LAC.
86  
3rd Brigade War Diary, 3rd Brigade Instructions for Practice Attack, 20 May
1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4878, LAC.
87  
Canadian Corps GS War Diary, Canadian Corps Exercise No. 4, 29 June 1918,
RG9 III-D-3 v4817, LAC.
88  
2nd Brigade War Diary, 23 May 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4873, LAC.
83  
84  
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Figure 6. 1st Division illustration of “combined arms” tactics to overcome a machine gun
strongpoint, June 1918. [RG9 III-C-3 v4069, LAC]

Currie emphasized the importance of challenging long route
marches to harden the men and prepare them for extended
advances.89 The 102nd Battalion history declared, “In short, nothing
was neglected which might serve to harden the troops and fit them
or long marching under the severest conditions.”90 The effect was to
make the troops well prepared for the demands of battle. “I’d give
anything if you can only have a look at this battalion as it is at
Canadian Corps G.135/14-3, 30 April 1918, LAC.
L. McLeod Gould, From B.C. To Baisieux: Being the Narrative History of the
102nd Canadian Infantry Battalion, (Victoria, B.C.: T.R. Cusack, 1919), 89.

89  
90  
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present. I’ve never seen it in such fine shape physically before. The
men are all as hard as nails,” boasted Major Ian Sinclair of the 13th
Battalion in June 1918.91
Initially, the training was intense, but with the first postponement,
units switched to devoting the afternoons to sports to keep the men
engaged, develop unit cohesion, and develop physical fitness.92 As
Major Sinclair phrased it in a letter home, “The Canucks have never
seen any rest like this before and we’re certainly making the best of
it. We train hard every day up till about 1 pm —they put in the rest
of the day at sports.”93
It was not just the infantry that underwent this intense instruction,
but all the arms to ensure they could deal with open warfare. The
artillery and signals were part of the schemes as well as training on
their own.94 The instruction was as hard and demanding as that of
the infantry. As Lieutenant Selwyn Wilson wrote in the battery diary
after a day of open warfare training, “Very hard day.”95 It, however,
had the advantage of a major break from holding the line and
spending time in surroundings not savaged by war. “Practicing going
into action with speed and advancing and keeping communications
up with visual signalling was all a pleasant change from the recent
dug-out life,” was how the history of the 66th Battery described it.96
The engineers were in the process of a major reorganization into three
battalions per division, which consumed much of their time.97 But,
they did do some open warfare training.98

Sinclair to Dad, 22 June 1918, MG30 E153 v1, Sinclair Fonds, LAC.
For example, JBB [John Beswick Bailey], Cinquante-Quatre; Being a Short
History of the 54th Canadian Infantry Battalion, (1919), 22; 3rd Brigade War Diary,
May 1918, LAC; Edgar Stanford Russenholt, Six Thousand Canadian Men: Being
the History of the 44th Battalion Canadian Infantry 1914-1919, (Winnipeg: De
Montfort Press, 1932), 150.
93  
Sinclair to Rob, 3 July 1918, MG30 E153 v1, Sinclair Fonds, LAC.
94  
See for instance, 1st Division Artillery War Diary, 1 Division Artillery, G.2-2640,
3 May 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4959, LAC; 3rd Division G.89, 12 June 1918, 15/4, RG9
III-C-3 v4192, LAC.
95  
The Diary of the 13th Battery, Canadian Field Artillery 1914-1919, 21 May 1918,
MG30 E345, Selwyn Wilson Fonds, LAC.
96  
Anonymous, The Story of the Sixty-Sixth C.F.A., (Edinburgh: Turnbull & Spears,
1919), 67.
97  
See for instance, GOC Royal Engineers War Diary, May, June 1918, RG9 III-D-3
v4989, LAC.
98  
2nd Brigade Canadian Engineers War Diary, July 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4989, LAC.
91  
92  
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One of the great advantages of the Canadian Corps was the
ability to develop but also instil a common doctrine. It followed the
British precept of command authority where a unit’s commander was
ultimately responsible for training and the conduct of operations.
Thus, it was not a hard and fast set of rules but rather a starting
point for a shared approach of a theme with many variations. In
the British army this was not possible with divisions transferred
repeatedly between corps.99 Jonathan Boff in his work on the Third
Army in the Hundred Days wrote,
Doctrine played a role, but units also adapted their method according
to need or just their commander’s preference. Even within divisions
they sometimes responded to similar problems in different ways. This
applies not only to frontages and formations, but, more importantly, to
the application of small-unit combined arms warfare employing fire and
movement. At least a significant minority of units were unwilling, or
unable, to utilise such an approach.100

This would apply to the Canadian Corps, but not to the same degree
given the prolonged and rigorous training conducted by all but the
2nd Division, and the corps’ multiple control methods.
These control techniques were the mechanism by which the corps
would instill the doctrine and Currie’s intent in all ranks. A concrete
plan as the basis of the exercises and the attendance by senior officers
and staff, such as Currie and the division commanders, ensured the
rooting out of outmoded approaches.101 Typically, umpires at the end
of the exercise would discuss their findings and the senior officers
would summarize the results and what needed addressing.102 For
example in July, the 7th Battalion demonstrated the penetration of
the ‘Machine Gun Defence Zone’ attended by senior officers from
all three divisions. “After the demonstration, the Corps Commander
held a Conference at which the problems of getting through this Zone

Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third
Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 61-2.
100  
Ibid., 135.
101  
2nd Brigade War Diary, 15 May 1918, LAC; ibid., 2nd Brigade OO No. 23, 13
May 1918; Currie to Lipsett, 23 June 1918, LAC; 3rd Division GS War Diary, 20, 27
May 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4855, LAC; 12th Brigade War Diary, 21 May1918, LAC.
102  
See for instance, 3rd Brigade War Diary, 22 May 1918, LAC.
99  
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and other ‘open warfare’ questions were discussed.”103 By the end
of June, Currie was satisfied that his division and brigade generals
had sufficient practice in open warfare conditions. He wanted
units to concentrate on company and platoon training, but it was
important that his commanders monitor these exercises to ensure
proper adherence to doctrine.104 Another way to foster a consistent
approach was through platoon competitions that set an open warfare
problem where senior officers could highlight and communicate both
errors and successes to a larger audience.105 First run at the battalion
level, the competitions ran at each level up to the division. Finally,
Currie closely inspected troops and questioned subalterns about
infantry regulations and asked them to draw a map of the current
location.106 This was an impetus for field-grade officers to ensure
their subordinates were up to speed or risk a sharp check from him.
Thus, the corps did not just hand-out doctrinal statements to the
subordinate formations, but took an active role in monitoring and
enforcing it.

delta benefits
The key benefits of Delta were two-fold. It provided a template
of a planned operation to guide the doctrine and preparation of
training exercises. Repeated references to Delta in the documents
prove it was the basis for multiple tactical schemes.107 This gave
greater verisimilitude than a generic exercise and ensured the troops
would treat the training with more gravity. The history of the 13th
Battalion referred to how units entered brigade manoeuvres with
a spirit of competition and stratagems to gain the advantage.108

4th Division War Diary, 5 July, RG9 III-D-3 v4861, LAC.
Canadian Corps G.691/14-44, 21 June 1918, 10/23, RG9 III-C-4 v4348, LAC.
105  
10th Canadian Infantry Battalion Platoon Competition Results, 23 May 1918,
6/6, RG9 III-C-3 v4213, LAC; 10th Brigade War Diary, G-84-1, 21 May 1918, RG9
III-D-3 v4903, LAC; 3rd Brigade War Diary, 13 June 1918, LAC; 2nd Brigade War
Diary, 5 June 1918, LAC.
106  
The detailed instructions for Currie’s formal inspection indicate how exacting he
was, see 1st Division G.369-11, 9 May 1918, 7/3, RG9 III-C-3 v4025, LAC.
107  
2nd CMR War Diary, 8 May, 25 May 1918, and Appendix 2, RG9 III-D-3 v4947,
LAC; 2nd Brigade War Diary, 7-8 May 1918, LAC.
108  
R. C. Fetherstonhaugh, The 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada, 19141919, (13th Battalion, Royal Highlanders of Canada, 1925), 240.
103  
104  
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Table 2. Delta and Amiens Comparison.

An exercise order for the 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles (cmr )
stipulated, “As there are Sunken Roads, Hedges and Quarries in the
terrain to be occupied, Company and Platoon Commanders must be
prepared to deal promptly and intelligently with ‘Strong Points’ and
isolated ‘M-G Nests’.” Brigadier-General Victor Odlum stressed in
his Delta training instructions all ranks were to know the situation
“is a special one and that a special effort will be required of them.”109
Second, a key reason the corps so capably conducted the Amiens
operation with little preparation was Delta and the training carried
out from May. With the need for secrecy and limited time to assemble
in position, the Canadian Corps did not rehearse Amiens. This was
very much contrary to its practice of 1917. But, it had in effect been
already rehearsing the attack with the schemes and instruction
shaped by the Delta plan. It was in many respects similar to the
battle fought in August. As highlighted in Table 2, it mirrored the
Amiens plan and so provided the corps a template for this later
offensive. When the commander of the 2nd Battalion outlined the
Amiens plan, “it resembled closely the exercises to which the unit
11th Brigade War Diary, 11th Brigade Training Instructions, 6 May 1918, LAC.

109  
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had devoted the past few months.”110 According to Ken Radley in
his history of the 1st Division, “Much of the Delta concept came to
pass at Amiens: large numbers of tanks, surprise the key factor, rapid
infantry advance and special fire planning.”111
Delta provided the opportunity to crystallize the multiple
doctrinal sources available in May into concrete policies that the
corps practiced throughout May, June, and part of July. Issuing these
was an important step, but they were theoretical and evanescent
until put into action. The training for Delta and in the following
months allowed all the formation levels and arms to rehearse the new
doctrine, refine it, comprehend it, and gain confidence in it.
Three key challenges faced the corps if it were to effectively
implement the doctrine. First, it had to unlearn many bitter lessons
and abandon an approach used so successfully at Vimy, Hill 70, and
Passchendaele––always a difficult task. According to Macdonell, the
effects of trench warfare hung around the necks of the officers ‘like a
millstone’ of whom only a scant handful had prewar training relevant
to open warfare.112 As Lieutenant Charles Henry (5th cmr) put the
need for this instruction,
It was exactly what we needed to shake us out of the habits acquired
by years in the trenches; and there seems no reason to doubt but that
some small part at least of our success in the fighting during the last
three months of the war was due to our training in the Bomy area.113

Concerns over a lack of aggressiveness and unwillingness to assist
forces on the flanks were a common complaint of exercises. These
were a product of the limited horizons of static warfare.114 The
history of the British 17th Division framed this as:

110  
W. W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion (East. Ontario
Regiment), Canadian Expeditionary Force, in the Great War, 1914-1919, (Ottawa:
Published for the Historical Committee, 2nd Canadian Battalion, C.E.F., 1947), 256.
111  
Radley, We Lead, Others Follow, 325.
112  
Macdonell, “Old Red Patch 1,” 389.
113  
Bomy was one of the areas in the First Army rear devoted to training. See
“Savage, Charles Henry Memoir: 1936,” The Canadian Letters and Images Project,
http://www.canadianletters.ca/content/document-8359, (24 September 2017).
114  
See for instance, 2nd Brigade War Diary, Appendix 6 Notes on Instructional
Exercises Carried out By The the 7th C.I. Battn, on June 27th, 1918, LAC; Remarks
of Officer Commanding on Tactical Operations Carried out by the 78th Battalion,
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For years they had acted under elaborate and detailed schemes and
orders that defined even the movement of a small group of trench
raiders, and set forth the targets of every gun brought into action to
cover the operation. Their leaders had always had elaborate maps of
every foot of ground, and had often rehearsed every movement even of
a platoon.115

Issues in shifting the mind set were wide ranging. This included
matters as mundane as ensuring to include the time of issue on
orders––something that had gone into abeyance during static warfare
conditions.116 The gunners had a major challenge as they had to
adopt open warfare techniques. It had to be far more mobile and
decentralized with field artillery brigades breaking down to batteries
and even sections assigned to forward forces.117 Without registration,
the gunners had to ensure they fully understood the dictates of
predicted fire and become proficient at it.118 The signal service and
those who relied on it had to renounce the dependence on a lavish
system of wired communications and learn to rely on visual, wireless,
runners, and despatch riders.
Next, the corps had to train all ranks and arms to execute the new
tactics, including ones that were rarely, if ever, previously practiced.
The daily training schedule included novel activities such as open
warfare advances under platoon command, house-to-house fighting,
manoeuvring in smoke, and battalions advancing with attached
field artillery sections.119 The troops, staff, and commanders had to
carry out these tactics confident in their abilities and those of their
peers, superiors, and subordinates. As Urquhart in his 16th Battalion
regimental history explained, “These were tactics which called for
an exceptional degree of daring and resource in the infantry.”120
The artillery had to instill the techniques of predicted fire requiring
precision and calculation of multiple complex factors far beyond what
115  
A.A. Hilliard Atteridge, History of the 17th (Northern) Division, (Albion Press,
1929), loc 4353-4365. Kindle edition.
116  
Canadian Corps G.595/29-22, 18 June 1918, 11/10, RG9 III-C-3 v4201, LAC.
117  
Daniel G. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory: Canada and the Great War,
(Edmonton: Hurtig, 1987), 23.
118  
G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment
of Canadian Artillery, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 332.
119  
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(Toronto: MacMillan, 1932), 262-3.
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as attempted before. Engineers had to rapidly repair and extend the
lines of communications to keep up with the advance.
Finally, not only did all levels have to perform the new doctrine
but to do so at a brisk tempo of a different order than before. Rather
than days to prepare for an attack, every echelon had hours, which
placed a particular pressure on intermediate commanders and their
staffs. As Macdonell wrote, “The Drocourt-Quéant operations and
fighting for the jump-off line were all carried out in a much shorter
time than would have been considered necessary for preparation
for a trench raid the preceding winter.”121 Units did not have time
to generate multi-page tomes for an action and plan for every
eventuality. The 12th Brigade order for the Drocourt-Quéant attack
on 2 September 1918 was two pages, while its order for Vimy was
fifteen with another eight of administrative instructions.122 This
accelerated pace meant more responsibility pushed down to the lower
echelons. This made greater demands on them and required a higher
standard of training and experience than before. As the 1st Division
post-Arras report claimed, actions were often rapid without time for
thorough explanations so commanders had to rely on the experience
and training of subordinates.123 This was in line with the instructions
in ss 135 The Training and Employment of Divisions 1918 that in
open warfare conditions:
…it is necessary that commanders of all grades should be trained to
grasp quickly the essential features of a tactical situation, and to issue
orders dealing with it. It is equally important that the troops should be
trained to put these orders into immediate execution.124

The 2nd Division did not have this opportunity for extended training
prior to the Hundred Days. David Campbell asserts that the division
still conducted much training while it was in the line and that its
aggressive raid policy ensured it was ready.125 It was not, however,

Macdonell, “Old Red Patch 1,” 391.
12th Brigade War Diary, 12th Brigade Scarpe Instructions No.1, 31 August 1918,
LAC.
123  
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1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4836, LAC.
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125  
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able to run battalion and brigade manoeuvres like the other three
divisions.126 Campbell admits, referring to the 6th Brigade, that
“many officers and other ranks appear have been slow to translate
theory into effective practice.”127 It also did not get the same chance
to physically harden its troops as evidenced by complaints of too
many men falling out during route marches.128 Further, it ran its
raids only after extensive planning and rehearsals, which did not
prepare it for the faster tempo of the Hundred Days. This manifested
itself in a slower response time to operations during the Battle of the
Scarpe where its follow-on attacks on 27 and 28 August lagged that
of the 3rd Division by hours.129
Delta and its schemes played a crucial role in addressing all
three challenges. The repeated schemes, exercises, and manoeuvres
based on an actual plan highlighted the vestiges of the old thinking
and identified who needed correction. They were also beneficial in
engraining the new tactics in all the ranks. Once the training program
had inculcated the basics, the exercise tempo accelerated to reflect
the timing and expected velocity of Delta. An actual operational plan
allowed them to mimic the pace and details to make the exercise
more realistic. It assisted in developing the sped-up cadence of the
new doctrine.

conclusion
Units and commanders recognized the importance of the prolonged
training period. There were multiple references in post-action reports
of the value of the extended instruction in open warfare training

For instance, the 5th Brigade was only able to conduct platoon and company
level training while the 2nd Division was in the line. 5th Brigade War Diary, May
and June 1918, RG9 III-D-3 v4886, LAC.
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vol. 4: 8th August-26th September, (London: Macmillan and co., 1947), 327; 2nd
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afforded the Canadians. Three examples should suffice. The 9th
Brigade in its post-Arras report stated: “Initiative and resolution
as taught in practice in the Bomy Area were the great factors in
success.”130 The 1st Battalion agreed: “the fundament principles of
an “Open Warfare” offensive had been so thoroughly rehearsed that
their adoption was absolutely automatic, with the result that the
Battalion escaped with very few casualties,” referring to its success
at Amiens.131 As ‘Tommy’ Burns, a staff officer and later a Second
World War corps commander, explained in his autobiography, it was
during this period that the concept of fighting changed from waves
to fire and movement.132
While Delta was not executed, it provided vital experience in
preparing and planning for the types of operations conducted during
the Hundred Days. It represented a clear break with the operational
concepts employed in 1917 prior to Cambrai. It was a difference between
seeing a play diagrammed on a blackboard and actually running it
in conditions just short of combat. Having a concrete plan to prepare
schemes against was an invaluable element in readying the corps for
the strains of the Hundred Days. It helped in overcoming all three
challenges faced in ridding the corps of old thinking, mastering the
new, and at an accelerated tempo. It was also a valuable rehearsal for
the situation faced by the corps at Amiens. Finally, it demonstrated
how the Canadian Corps differed from the British Army in creating
and inculcating a corps level doctrine and the mechanisms used by the
senior commanders and staff to disseminate, enforce, and practice it.
Lance-Corporal Ken Foster (2nd Battalion) an old soldier who
endured this prolonged training experience should have the final word
to summarize Delta’s value. He remarked that by the middle of July
1918:
We were pretty well fed up with attacking hay-stacks and windmills. It
all seemed so un-necessary to us who had been through the same thing
too often. On the contrary, it came in very useful when a little later

130  
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on we came in contact with conditions such as we had been rehearsing,
even to the extent of wheatfields, windmills and haystacks.133
◆

◆

◆

◆
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